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BOILING DOWN BOILERPLATE IN M&A AGREEMENTS: A 
RESPONSE TO  
CHOI, GULATI, & SCOTT 
ROBERT ANDERSON† 
JEFFREY MANNS†† 
ABSTRACT 
  “Boilerplate” consists of standardized terms whose meaning is 
intended to be consistent from one transaction to the next, and these 
provisions are ubiquitous in contracts and related transactional 
documents. In their recent Duke Law Journal article Stephen Choi, 
Mitu Gulati, and Robert Scott have highlighted the potentially 
corrosive effect of the legal drafting process on boilerplate 
provisions. They show how incremental edits to boilerplate pari 
passu clauses for sovereign debt agreements have led to textual 
“black holes,” which potentially undercut the standardization 
purpose, wording, and substantive meaning of these boilerplate 
provisions. In this Article we offer preliminary evidence of a similar 
textual “black hole” phenomenon taking place in the mergers and 
acquisitions context. 
  We show that the mergers and acquisition context epitomizes the 
problem of unreflective copying of precedent provisions combined 
with ad hoc edits to individual clauses, which erode the textual 
integrity and meaning of boilerplate provisions. Each agreement is 
based on a prior deal precedent, and drafters frequently incorporate 
sections of the prior deal without sufficient scrutiny about the degree 
to which idiosyncratic novelties have been introduced in the 
precedent document that may be inapplicable to the new deal. At the 
same time, high levels of “editorial churning” take place in the 
process of transforming each precedent into the current acquisition 
agreement. The result is a problem of “drafting drift.” Boilerplate 
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provisions live on from deal to deal, yet gradually shed their textual 
integrity and potentially lose their clear meaning as ad hoc edits are 
copied from deal to deal and new ad hoc edits are added at each 
stage.  
  We show how it is possible to identify the paragraphs of 
acquisition agreements which serve as boilerplate and to document 
both the degree and type of textual “drift” of these provisions over 
multiple generations. We construct “family trees” for boilerplate 
provisions by tracing the ancestors of each provision backwards in 
a linear way to each prior precedent. Then we reverse the process 
to show how ancestor provisions have progeny extending out in 
multiple directions which become increasingly dissimilar to their 
original ancestor and to each other over a few generations of 
acquisition agreements.  
   Our study shows that incremental changes in boilerplate from 
one generation to the next foster rapid “speciation” of the terms. 
Small additions and deletions from boilerplate text lead to 
significant cumulative effects over multiple generations. We 
demonstrate that this textual “drift” takes place both within 
individual boilerplate lineages, but also even more broadly for 
boilerplate provisions that have a common ancestor precedent, yet 
evolve separately along different lineages of precedents. Like the 
Big Bang, the heterogeneity of boilerplate text appears to increase 
in all directions, which supports an “expanding universe” theory for 
boilerplate that undermines the textual integrity and the meaning of 
boilerplate terms. While we will expand on the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the evolution of boilerplate in a future work, 
the preliminary evidence presented in this paper reinforces the case 
for the textual “black hole” theory.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of boilerplate terms heightens legal certainty, drafting 
efficiency, and the universality of provisions by providing uniform language 
whose meaning has stood the test of time.1 The challenge is that legal drafters 
frequently compose transactional documents that are neither completely 
negotiated nor completely standardized. Lawyers routinely recycle 
boilerplate provisions from earlier precedents. But instead of adhering to 
boilerplate language, lawyers often appear to engage in idiosyncratic edits 
that gradually transform the text of ostensibly standardized language.  
In their recent Duke Law Journal article, Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, 
and Robert Scott used the sovereign debt agreement context to show how 
over time textual “black holes” have developed as edits aggregate from deal 
to deal and warp the textual integrity and meaning of boilerplate provisions.2 
In this piece, we provide preliminary evidence that the “black hole” drafting 
pathology identified by Choi, Gulati, and Scott extends beyond the sovereign 
debt context and also characterizes the drafting process in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) transactions.3  
 In our recent article, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements,4 
we show how M&A agreements combine elements of standardization with 
high levels of “editorial churning,” ad hoc edits that appear to be cosmetic 
rather than substantive. This combination fosters high levels of “speciation” 
among merger agreements, which causes agreements as a whole (at the 
“macro” level) to bear little similarity to their precedent progenitors even 
over a few generations. In a subsequent article we applied those insights 
about macro-level agreement drift to suggest pathways to greater efficiency 
in M&A drafting.5 That work only looked at agreements as a whole, 
 
 1. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization & Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–20 (1997) (discussing the potential “learning benefits” of 
commonly used terms); Michael Klausner, Standardization & Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 81 
VA. L. REV. 757, 783–84 (1995) (discussing the network benefits from familiarity with boilerplate terms). 
 2. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu G. Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–4 (2017) (discussing the black hole problem in the context of the pari 
passu clause, a boilerplate provision in sovereign debt contracts); see also Christopher J. French, The 
Illusion of Insurance Contracts, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 535 (2017) (discussing the difficulties of determining 
the intent of drafters of standard form language in insurance contracts). 
 3. See Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the need for broader empirical research 
on the extent of rote usage and encrustation in boilerplate provisions). 
 4. Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017). 
       5.    Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater Efficiency in Mergers and Acquisitions, 
72 BUS. LAW. 657 (2017). 
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potentially overlooking evolution in individual paragraphs and sections of 
boilerplate text (at the “micro” level). 
 In this Article we shift our focus to the micro-level of boilerplate clauses 
of M&A agreements to examine how editorial churning affects the drafting 
process. We show how cosmetic edits rapidly accumulate over time and 
distort the form of boilerplate provisions in M&A agreements, which we 
would expect to change rarely, if ever, from one deal to the next. Our 
preliminary findings in the M&A context support the textual “black hole” 
thesis. Lawyers’ “rote usage” of boilerplate without examination of the 
terms, coupled with “encrustation,” the retention of idiosyncratic textual 
variations, have undercut the meaning of boilerplate provisions and created 
the preconditions necessary for textual “black holes.” 
What distinguishes our approach from that of Choi, Gulati, and Scott is 
the scale and method of analysis that we use to analyze this drafting 
pathology in the distinctive M&A context. M&A is different from most other 
contractual settings because of the extent of its artisanal drafting and lack of 
standardization. This fact makes analyzing the evolution of M&A boilerplate 
important, since these provisions serve as some of the few sources of 
standardization. We leverage our data set of over 12,000 public company 
merger agreements from 1994 to 2014 to create a comprehensive picture of 
the evolution of boilerplate provisions over time. We use a computer 
program to identify and analyze the word-for-word differences between 
boilerplate provisions. This approach allows us to measure the degree of 
textual similarity or dissimilarity based on the number of insertions and 
deletions (i.e., edits) in boilerplate provisions across agreements.  
We show how it is possible to identify the paragraphs of acquisition 
agreements which serve as boilerplate and demonstrate both the degree and 
type of textual “drift” of these provisions over multiple generations. We 
construct “family trees” for boilerplate provisions by tracing the descendants 
of each “ancestor” provision. We show that common ancestors have progeny 
extending out in multiple directions which become increasingly dissimilar to 
each other over a few generations of acquisition agreements. This textual 
“drift” takes place within individual boilerplate lineages. The textual “Big 
Bang” effect is even more pronounced for boilerplate provisions that have a 
common ancestor precedent, but evolve separately along different lineages 
of precedents. We also show spatially that the pattern of boilerplate 
“speciation” underscores the high impact of editorial churning in 
undercutting standardization of boilerplate. 
Our preliminary findings suggest that the macro-problem of acquisition 
agreement “speciation” takes place throughout the micro-level of boilerplate 
provisions. Lawyers appear to recycle boilerplate without giving adequate 
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thought to the meaning of this language or the impact of editorial changes. 
The result is “drafting drift.” Boilerplate provisions live on from deal to deal, 
yet gradually shed their textual integrity and potentially lose their clear 
meaning as ad hoc edits are copied from deal to deal and new ad hoc edits 
are added at each stage. The random variations that the “encrustation” and 
“abrasion” of boilerplate text introduce in the drafting process appear to be 
even more severe in the merger agreement context than in other contractual 
settings, leading to rapid drift away from the original boilerplate. 
Part I lays out our data and methodology as well as delineate the 
distinctive challenges of identifying boilerplate in non-standardized 
documents. Part II provides empirical evidence substantiating the high 
degree of textual drift within both lineages of boilerplate and the even more 
extensive drift between the divergent branches of boilerplate with a common 
precedent ancestor. Part III discusses some of the implications and 
shortcomings of this study that we will address in greater detail in a future 
work.  
I.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Situating the Boilerplate Study in Our Larger Project 
This Article builds on our larger project of systematically examining 
the evolution of public company merger agreements and exposing the high 
degree of editorial churning.6 In that piece, we documented the extensive 
“drift” in merger agreements over time as precedents are used, edited, and 
reused in deals.  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates 
disclosure of public company acquisition agreements, which provide a 
window into the end product of lawyering that the public often is unable to 
see in other areas of transactional law.7 The challenge, however, is that no 
one outside of the drafting deliberations can witness the process that leads to 
the formation of acquisition agreements. Ironically, even the lawyers 
involved in any given transaction may not necessarily appreciate the full 
implications of the drafting give and take on the substance of the legal text.  
The myriad of lawyers involved in drafting, the scale of the edits, and the 
compressed time period of drafting means that no one involved in the 
transaction may be positioned to scrutinize the full extent and potential 
impact of textual changes.    
 
 6. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4. 
 7. See SEC, FORM 8-K, ITEM 1.01, at 4, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WE5G-A7CY] (requiring companies to disclose material definitive agreements outside of the 
ordinary course of business including merger agreements). 
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We seek to reverse engineer the drafting process to identify potential 
inefficiencies and textual distortions by analyzing the evolution of public 
company acquisition agreements provisions.8 In our previous study we 
leveraged SEC-mandated disclosures to compile a dataset of public company 
mergers from 1994 to 2014, which covers over 12,000 agreements.9 In this 
Article we use this dataset to examine micro-level evolution of deal-terms. 
Acquisition agreements are so complex, and the legal stakes so high, that 
nearly every public company merger agreement is based on an earlier 
acquisition agreement that serves as its precedent.10 We use computer textual 
analysis tools to show how it is possible to identify the precedent which 
serves as the template for the drafting of each deal.11 We leverage computer 
technology to lift the veil on the drafting process by showing how 
agreements are created and how both documents as a whole and individual 
provisions change in incremental ways over time.12 
 
 8. Other notable empirical works also examine changes in contractual provisions in other 
transactional contexts. See, e.g., MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3½ MINUTE TRANSACTION: 
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 3–10 (2013) (using empirical data to show that 
once a boilerplate provision is in place it often becomes part of a transactional checklist regardless of its 
actual value-added); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical 
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 930, 932–34 (2004) (conducting empirical analysis of 
sovereign bond offerings to show that boilerplate provisions changed in response to significant shifts in 
the interpretation of key provisions, but only after an industry-wide delay which reflected the reluctance 
of lawyers to change boilerplate provisions); Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path and Pride: Third Party 
Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 
113–14 (2005) (using qualitative interviews to assess the logic behind lawyers’ drafting of third-party 
closing opinions). 
 9. See supra note 7. 
 10. See SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING CONTRACTS: A GUIDE TO THE PRACTICAL 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 5–6 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing how attorneys “rarely 
start to draft on a blank slate. . . . [and generally] start with an existing contract or form”). 
 11. See TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: HOW AND WHY LAWYERS DO WHAT THEY DO 
335–36 (2007) (discussing the benefits of heightened efficiency and legal certainty from precedent-based 
legal drafting). 
 12. Two other notable empirical studies provide similar prisms for understanding the M&A drafting 
process, yet reach different conclusions. Professor Coates documents the growth in length of merger 
agreements over the past twenty years, which he attributes to changes in legal risks and deal and financing 
markets, as well as the increase in “linguistic complexity’ of these documents. See generally John C. 
Coates, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals, (European Corp. Gov. 
Inst., Working Paper No. 333/2016, 2016), at 16–28, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2862019. 
Professor Jennejohn argues that the complexity of M&A exposes acquisition agreements to multiple 
sources of path dependency which undercuts efforts at standardization. See generally Matthew Jennejohn, 
Assymetric Standardization in M&A Agreements (Mar. 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
authors). Numerous other studies have examined the development of particular acquisition agreement 
provisions. See generally Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse 
Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2010) (discussing attempts at reallocating deal risks through 
reverse termination fees that compensate target companies should the buyer walk away, and assessing the 
impact such attempts have on acquisition agreement drafting); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic 
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By identifying the precedent for each deal, we are able to pinpoint the 
exact edits from one deal to the next. We can analyze the overall extent of 
edits to highlight potential churning as well as identify individual changes 
within particular provisions. Additionally, we can assess the degree to which 
a particular section of the agreement remains consistent from deal to deal 
(e.g. a truly boilerplate provision) or is the focal point of drafting activity.  
This approach allows us to show empirically that a high level of 
“editorial churning” takes place as merger agreements appear riddled with 
edits that are cosmetic and unnecessary.13 The drafting of every acquisition 
agreement necessarily entails deal-specific edits and reflects a fusion of the 
vision for the agreement from both parties as they seek to frame or reframe 
terms to their advantage.14 Additionally, innovations are taking place in 
acquisition agreements in a more episodic fashion in response to exogenous 
events. But our analysis found that over half of the text of merger agreements 
is routinely rewritten from one deal to the next, suggesting that there is a 
high level of inefficiency in the precedent selection and drafting process that 
cannot be explained away in terms of substantive changes in acquisition 
agreements.15   
Our initial study demonstrated that public merger agreement terms are 
not based off a common “form” agreement, but rather are the product of a 
highly path-dependent “evolution” over many generations.16 This point is 
 
Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (arguing 
that before closing the deal, the intentional vagueness of material adverse change (“MAC”) clauses 
creates more efficient incentives for the seller, rather than more precise and less costly proxies); Yair Y. 
Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 846 
(discussing how unclear judicial interpretations of the contours of MAC clauses and material adverse 
effect (“MAE”) clauses cast a shadow over merger deals); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, 
Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330 (2005) (using economic 
modeling to analyze the role that MAC and MAE clauses play in the structure of the standard acquisition 
agreement and the incentive effects for acquirers and targets); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions 
in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2003) (discussing the significance of Delaware’s 
judicially created limitations on deal protection provisions meant to resolve the conflicting incentives of 
the acquirer’s and target’s management when facing last minute third-party bids); Claire A. Hill, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 191 (2009) (arguing that the legal terms in acquisition agreements are intentionally ambiguous 
to deter litigation and incentivize negotiators to close the deal); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010) (arguing for interpretative default rules in 
construing MAC clauses). 
 13. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 61–62; see also infra Part III.   
 14. See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law 
of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 277 (1990) (discussing the tradeoffs between 
standardization and customization in contractual drafting). 
     15. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 75–77. 
      16. See id. at 82–83. 
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true even within large law firms where drafts are based on prior agreements 
rather than standardized form language. The absence of even firm-specific 
forms has led to haphazard and inconsistent lawyering, as lawyers add 
significant amounts of deal-specific edits to each deal and inadvertently 
retain deal-specific information from prior deals.  
Our initial paper reflected a macro-view of editorial churning in 
assessing the extent of word changes from precedent to the final deal in each 
of the 12,000 agreements, however we did not engage in fine-grained 
analysis of particular provisions to test our hypothesis of drafting 
inefficiency. For this reason our original paper did not directly support the 
“black hole” theory. Although we found extensive editing between precedent 
and final draft, it is possible that legal drafters were simply integrating 
paragraphs or whole sections of text as they engaged in innovative 
lawyering.17 
 In this paper we address this limitation of our prior study by examining 
the extent of changes in individual boilerplate provisions from deal to deal. 
Our preliminary findings are that similar editorial churning and drift are 
apparent when provisions are examined on a clause-by-clause basis as well 
as when agreements are examined as a whole. Our data shows that 
boilerplate provisions like virtually every other part of acquisition 
agreements are drifting over time due to incremental changes in each 
agreement which have cumulative effects over multiple generations. 
Haphazard editing takes place throughout virtually every part of acquisition 
agreements which afflicts even ostensibly standardized boilerplate language 
and potentially erodes the text and meaning.  
B. Methodology 
Our study compiled a data set of 12,407 merger agreements filed with 
the SEC between 1994 and 2014 and performed a word-for-word 
comparison of each of these documents.18 The computer script visited each 
URL contained in the Archive Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database and 
collected the full text of each acquisition agreement.19 We excluded any 
 
 17. Cf. Coates, supra note 12, at 16–28 (arguing that the doubling in the length of merger 
agreements over the past twenty years reflects responses to changes in legal risks and deal and financing 
markets, as well as the increase in the linguistic complexity of these documents).   
 18. See Archive Indices of the SEC EDGAR Database, SEC (last modified Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/edgar_archive_indices [https://perma.cc/USL4-V94J]. 
 19. Exhibit 2 is the exhibit where merger agreements are filed, along with any other “plan of 
acquisition, reorganization, arrangement, liquidation or succession.” See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(2) 
(1995). Such agreements can also be filed under Exhibit 10, but primarily when they relate to other 
companies, such as subsidiaries. 
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document whose title did not contain “merger” or “reorganization” to ensure 
that we were not including any non-acquisition agreements.20 We also 
excluded duplicative agreements, intra-firm reorganizations, 
reincorporations in other states, and private company acquisitions.21 We also 
eliminated older plain-text agreements for which paragraph demarcations are 
unreliable,22 resulting in a focus of a subset of our database on agreements 
filed after 2001. 
The key to our analysis is the use of a computer program to engage in a 
word-for-word comparison of each agreement to every other agreement in 
the data set. The underlying premise is that a document retains substantial 
word-for-word similarity to its precedent document even after a high degree 
of edits.  While every drafting process entails a degree of deal-specific 
changes, we can still identify the textual “DNA” linking a document to its 
precedent. This similarity is not present among documents that were not 
copied directly or indirectly from one another, even when the documents 
deal with identical subject matter. 
The same logic applies for our comparison of boilerplate provisions 
from precedent to subsequent agreement across numerous generations. The 
computer program calculated the “edit distance” (also known as the 
Levenshtein distance) between each pair of agreements.23 Edit distance is a 
method for measuring the extent of textual similarity or dissimilarity based 
on the number of insertions and deletions (i.e., edits) that differentiate two 
documents.24 The concept is analogous to the traditional “blacklining” or 
“redlining” process of comparing two documents with one another, which is 
 
 20. This approach eliminates agreement types that may overlap such as “Contribution Agreement,” 
“Stock Purchase Agreement,” “Asset Purchase Agreement,” “Transaction Agreement,” “Share Exchange 
Agreement,” “Arrangement Agreement,” and the like. Although these agreements certainly contain 
overlapping language, this study focused on documents that were clearly public company acquisition 
agreements. Very short documents that are less than 15,000 characters were also eliminated because these 
agreements likely did not address the complex issues raised in larger public company acquisitions. Mutual 
holding company conversions were also excluded. 
 21. Near duplicates were defined as those documents filed within 100 days of each other and having 
97 percent or more similarity to one another. Most of these were the identical document, but some were 
amended and restated versions of the same document. Many of the documents contained extraneous text 
such as attachments to the main merger agreement. To remove this text, this study disregarded text 
following the first occurrence (if any) of “In witness whereof,” which typically signals the end of a merger 
agreement. 
 22. The paragraph demarcations are unreliable because paragraphs are separated with carriage 
returns but so are page breaks, making it ambiguous in many cases whether particular text is separated 
by a new paragraph or a new page. The HTML documents have tags indicating new paragraphs and 
therefore do not suffer from this problem. 
 23. See DAN GUSFIELD, ALGORITHMS ON STRINGS, TREES, AND SEQUENCES: COMPUTER SCIENCE 
AND COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 215–16 (1997) (discussing the Levenshtein distance). 
 24. See id. 
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routinely used in transactional law drafting. This approach is also similar to 
those used to detect plagiarism in writing, which can detect common ancestry 
of texts even after significant editing.25 
The difference in our approach is that we are seeking to assess 
quantitatively the degree of difference between each agreement in our dataset 
in order to determine which agreement is most likely to form the precedent 
for the drafting of a subsequent agreement. The computer program allowed 
us to engage in this comparative analysis for each agreement in our database. 
As a result, we were able to identify the likely precedent document for each 
merger agreement in the database by determining which document had the 
smallest length-normalized pairwise edit distance (among those with earlier 
dates than the given document). This finding provided us with a window for 
seeing the starting point and the end result for the drafting of each acquisition 
agreement, so that we could establish quantitatively the degree of edits in 
each transaction. We then compared the individual paragraphs in the 
descendant agreement to its ancestor agreement to determine the source for 
each paragraph in the descendant.  
C. The Backdrop of Evidence of Inefficiency in M&A Agreements 
The starting point for every M&A deal entails the selection of a 
precedent agreement, which serves as the textual base from which the deal 
document is drafted.  M&A agreements typically reflect a process of back-
and-forth negotiations between the acquirer and target (and their counsel). 
Typically, the lawyers for the acquirer select the precedent to use as the base 
for the agreement, customize the draft to fit the needs of the current deal, and 
forward the agreement to the target.26  Counsel for the target will then 
propose changes to the acquirer’s draft and initiate negotiations which focus 
on changes to particular provisions rather than the “form” of the agreement.27  
This process goes back-and-forth several times before the draft is finalized. 
 
 25. See, e.g., Zhan Su et al., Plagiarism Detection Using the Levenshtein Distance and Smith-
Waterman Algorithm, 2008 Innovative Computing Info. & Control 569, 569–72. 
 26. See ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE CONTRACTS: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 1-20 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing basic strategies in drafting contracts); JAMES C. 
FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR NEGOTIATING CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 26–27 (1975) (discussing how the power to make the first draft gives the drafter leverage 
over other parties). 
 27. See Thomas E. Tyner, Mechanics of Document Drafting, in DRAFTING BUSINESS CONTRACTS: 
PRINCIPLES, TECHNIQUES & FORMS 1-1, 1-16 (2015) (discussing the limitations lawyers face in 
suggesting revisions to a draft); FREUND, supra note 25, at 28 (“Typically, the seller should live with the 
purchaser’s form of agreement, without being precluded in any way from negotiating any and all 
substantive matters.”). 
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In theory the reliance on a precedent agreement suggests that lawyers 
and clients value the legal certainty that comes from building on precedents 
and boilerplate provisions whose language has stood the test of time (and of 
courts). Additionally, one might expect that acquisition agreements would 
have significant textual similarity since they generally follow similar broad 
outlines of categories of provisions. But contrary to these plausible 
hypotheses we found that there was little evidence of standardization among 
merger agreements. Not only was there significant divergence in the text 
from each agreement to its precedent, but there was also remarkable diversity 
in the merger templates that law firms used. Table I, excerpted from our prior 
article, highlights the small degree of commonalities among merger 
agreements based on word-for-word comparisons.28  
 
Table I. Similarity Distribution of the Data 
 Percentage of Pairwise Comparisons 
More than 30% 
Similar 0.5% 
25–30% Similar 3.8% 
20–25% Similar 44.7% 
15–20% Similar 40.3% 
10–15% Similar 7.4% 
Less than 10% 
Similar 3.4% 
Median 19.9% 
Mean 19.5% 
*Based on a sample of 50,000 random comparisons drawn 
from the documents.  
 
The most striking finding is that only 4.3 percent of agreements were 
more than 25 percent the same despite the fact that they had nearly identical 
substantive provisions and subject matter. These findings suggest that the 
world of acquisition agreements is strikingly diverse even though these 
agreements deal with similar categories of information, and even though 
each agreement is based on a precedent. The mean and median degree of 
similarity of documents were less than 20 percent, which suggests that there 
is only a small core of standardization that cuts across the agreements.  
 
        28. See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 70 & Tbl. I. 
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Another step in our empirical analysis entailed examining the degree of 
divergence between each precedent and the resulting agreement. The 
previous paragraph discusses similarity of random chosen pairs, but here we 
are examining the similarity between agreements related to each other. While 
we show earlier the extensive degree of diversity among acquisition 
agreements, the most telling evidence of inefficiency is the high level of 
editorial churning in the drafting process even in documents copied from one 
another. Figure I, drawn from our prior article, shows the percentage of the 
textual similarity between documents and their precedents, assessed at the 
whole document level.29 
Figure I. Similarity of Documents to Precedents 
 
Figure I highlights the high degree of editorial churning that takes place 
during the drafting process. While there are significant outliers on both ends 
of similarity and dissimilarity, the largest number of acquisition agreements 
have approximately 50 percent similarity to their nearest precedent. Some 
acquisition agreements have 80 percent or greater similarity with their 
precedents. But most of these documents are repeat-player acquisitions 
involving the same acquirer which means they have limited applicability to 
the broader pattern of precedent selection.  
It would be challenging to assess the precise degree of inefficiency 
because deal-specific edits are an essential part of every deal, and the degree 
of edits will necessarily vary based off of the transaction. But we can 
 
     29.  See id. at 75 & Fig. 2. 
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estimate the amount of time that lawyers are investing in the drafting process 
to put the potential degree of editorial churning in context. From 1994 to 
2014 the median number of words in an acquisition agreement increased 
from about 21,000 words to approximately 39,400 words a year.30  The rate 
of increase was just over 900 words a year as there was a remarkable 
“accretion effect” that led to a near doubling in the length of the average 
acquisition agreement. Table II highlights the dramatic increase in the length 
of merger agreements over time. 
Table II. Average Length of Acquisition Agreements from 1994–2014 
 
Average 
Number of 
Words 
1994 21,013.5 
1995 22,435.5 
1996 21,110.0 
1997 21,653.0 
1998 22,582.0 
1999 23,850.0 
2000 24,685.0 
2001 25,601.0 
2002 26,186.5 
2003 26,697.0 
2004 27,378.0 
2005 29,116.0 
2006 30,360.0 
2007 31,992.0 
2008 33,134.0 
2009 35,344.5 
2010 35,941.0 
2011 37,467.5 
2012 36,736.0 
2013 37,614.0 
2014 39,403.0 
 
Of course some of this additional word count may be justified by legal 
responses to exogenous events or other substantive developments in the 
 
     30.   See id. at 75–76; see also Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Engineering Greater Efficiency in 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 72 BUS. LAW. 657, 678–79 & Tbl. IV. 
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architecture of acquisition agreements. But while Professor Coates has 
pointed to some degree of substantive changes over this period,31 in reality 
there appears to be little substance to justify this dramatic expansion in the 
length of merger agreements.  
The evidence of a consistently high level of editing suggests that 
lawyers are ineffectively engaging in precedent selection and document 
design throughout the drafting process. Some deals may require more edits 
because of the unique nature of the deal, but “revolutionary” deals are few 
and far between, and the degree of editorial churning that routinely occurs in 
the deal process suggests that there is inefficiency in the precedent selection 
and document design.  
D. The Challenge of Delineating Boilerplate 
Having provided evidence of underinvestment in precedent selection 
and high levels of editorial churning, we turn to the more granular question 
of whether the textual changes reflect the wholesale insertion of new 
provisions and paragraphs or whether editorial churning is pervasive 
throughout the document. This question is key to testing the black hole 
theory for boilerplate provisions, as we would expect to see the highest 
degree of standardization in acquisition agreements at the paragraph or 
provision level for boilerplate text if it were being substantively embraced. 
We compared the individual paragraphs in each agreement to its 
precedent agreement to determine the source for each paragraph in the 
agreement. Our challenge was defining what constitutes boilerplate because 
of the high degree of edits throughout the agreements. Some types of clauses 
are readily classified as “boilerplate” based on their subject matter (e.g., 
Governing Law, Entire Agreement, Waiver of Jury Trial). Many other 
clauses, however, do not fall neatly into the boilerplate or non-boilerplate 
category, raising the question of how to define boilerplate text. This question 
is a threshold issue for empirical analysis of boilerplate in any context, as 
text is reused in many ways, even in fully negotiated paragraphs (e.g., jargon 
phraseology). But only certain types of reused text reach a sufficiently high 
degree of standardization to qualify as boilerplate. 
To answer this question, we turn to the data itself. The following figure 
presents the distribution of the percentage similarity of paragraphs to their 
nearest ancestor paragraph in the precedent agreement, denoted by the solid 
 
 31. See generally Coates, supra note 10, at 16–28 (attributing the growth in the length of merger 
agreements over the past twenty years to “reactive growth,” such as new case law, statutes, and finance 
risks, “innovative growth” such as new ways of achieving client goals, as well as the increase in 
“linguistic complexity’ of these documents). 
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line.32 For comparison purposes, the dotted line shows the percentage 
similarity between paragraphs and the nearest paragraph from a merger 
agreement chosen at random (i.e. not the precedent document).  
Figure II: Distribution of Similarities Between Paragraphs  
 
 32. This data was generated by drawing ten paragraphs at random from each descendant and 
computing the normalized edit distance to the closest paragraphs in the immediate ancestor for each such 
paragraph. 
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 The Figure makes it clear that there is a bimodal distribution of 
similarity to precedent paragraphs, with a fairly strong bifurcation between 
boilerplate provisions and fully negotiated provisions. The right hump in the 
solid line is the relatively common boilerplate provisions that are 70–100 
percent similar to their precedents. The left hump in the solid line is the 
negotiated provisions that are not much more similar than clauses from 
random agreements. Interestingly, in the middle there is a range between 40–
70 percent similar where the moderately negotiated provisions in the 
precedent agreements are only slightly more similar to each other than the 
agreements chosen at random.  
The solid line in the Figure makes it clear that merger agreements 
contain a large number of boilerplate paragraphs, a large number of fully 
negotiated paragraphs, and relatively few paragraphs in between these 
extremes. This point validates the idea that boilerplate paragraphs differ 
qualitatively, not just quantitatively, from negotiated (generally deal-
specific) provisions. Relying on the Figure, we set the threshold for 
boilerplate copying at 70 percent similarity and up, which captures most of 
the agreements in the boilerplate category. Thus, our analysis focuses on the 
degree of continuity or evolution from precedent to the next between 
paragraphs that are 70 percent or more similar to one another.33 
Our interest is in the paragraphs that are copied over multiple 
generations to determine the degree and type of drift from the original 
ancestor over time. To examine this drift, we construct a “family tree” for 
the set of paragraphs. We begin by taking the set of paragraphs that have no 
descendants, which often (but not always) come from later agreements near 
the end of our data coverage. We then trace the copying history of each of 
those paragraphs back in time, finding its ancestor, the ancestor of the 
ancestor, and so on. Because each paragraph has only one immediate 
ancestor, these lineages do not branch as they are traced back in time. 
We then reverse the direction, constructing a family tree for each 
ancestor by tracing the descendants of each ancestor over time using the 
reverse-lineages just constructed. Accordingly, we follow the evolution of 
each lineage of paragraphs from the original ancestor to all of its direct and 
indirect descendants. This creates a tree-like structure for each ancestor. 
Some ancestors have many branches (and branches of branches), while 
others have a single lineage through time. 
 
     33.   As Figure II highlights, we could have alternatively set the threshold for boilerplate text at eighty 
percent similarity, which would have entailed a very similar data set while still accounting for the extent 
of drafting changes from deal to deal.   
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We then drew a sample of 28,717 ancestor paragraphs from the total set 
of 202,422 ancestor paragraphs to analyze, and we included all descendants 
of those ancestor paragraphs. The following table presents some descriptive 
statistics about the sample boilerplate paragraphs.  
Table III. Descriptive Statistics 
 Median Mean Standard Deviation 
Words per Paragraph 68 88.8 69.7 
Number of Edits per Paragraph per 
Generation 4 14.4 24.4 
Number of Generations per Lineage 2 2.9 1.4 
 
The boilerplate paragraphs tend to be relatively short, with a median 
length of 68 words, and tend to have relatively few edits from one generation 
to the next, with a median number of words edited of just 4 (about 6 percent 
of the median paragraph length). This finding is expected since these are 
boilerplate provisions.  The lineages also tend to be very short, with the 
median lineage only two generations long (meaning that the median 
paragraph was copied only once). This latter result occurs because most 
merger agreements themselves are copied only once (if at all), with the 
descendant never being copied again. This means that there are a lot of “dead 
ends” in the evolutionary process. In some cases we find that paragraphs are 
copied over many generations of agreements. In other cases, paragraphs are 
copied once and then become “extinct.” Having established reasonable 
parameters for what constitutes boilerplate provisions in the M&A context 
and a framework for identifying family trees for these provisions, we turn to 
our analysis of the degree of drift in boilerplate provisions over time. 
II.  RESULTS 
In this Part we examine the evolution of boilerplate clauses from three 
different perspectives. First, we examine the extent of drafting drift over 
generations between the original boilerplate ancestor provision and direct 
and indirect linear descendants. Second, we examine the astounding variety 
of descendant clauses produced by a single boilerplate ancestor which evolve 
separately along different lineages of precedents. Third, we examine the 
geometry of the relationships among the clauses to illustrate spatially the 
high degree of divergence in boilerplate provisions over time. 
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A. The Drift of Lineages over Time 
The theory developed in the “black holes” literature suggests the 
possibility that slippage in the drafting process will have cumulative effects 
that will distort the boilerplate text. If drafters are unable to identify all non-
standard edits embedded in a precedent document (or simply fail to invest 
time in checking for consistency), some of the edits from previous 
transactions will be retained in addition to the edits added for the present 
transaction. As a result, each generation of a paragraph will tend to differ 
more from the original ancestor provision than the last generation. Thus, if 
slippage is occurring we should observe paragraphs drifting further from 
their original ancestors as the number of generations between the drafts 
increases. 
To examine whether paragraphs drift over time, we examined all 
lineages with at least six generations and compared the text of each 
descendant paragraph at each generation to the original ancestor. The results 
of this comparison are presented in Figure III below, with point estimates 
and 95 percent confidence intervals denoted by the points and bars, 
respectively. 
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Figure III: Distance From Ancestor by Generation 
The amount of average overall drift from one generation to the next is 
remarkable considering that because of our focus on boilerplate provisions 
most pairs of paragraphs in our analysis only have very slight edits (or even 
none in any given generation). Small changes have cumulative effects over 
multiple generations, however, eventually producing a descendant that is 
quite different from its ancestor in terms of the text. Over a long enough time 
horizon the substance of these provisions may be transformed which may 
undermine the purpose of having standardized text. 
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B. The Heterogeneity of Descendants over Time 
This subpart examines the degree of heterogeneity that develops among 
the descendants of a particular ancestor over time. In other words, to what 
extent does a single ancestor produce a variety of descendant clauses? 
Although this question is closely tied to the drift of each lineage over time 
examined in subpart A, the two issues are distinct. It is entirely possible that 
different lineages from the same ancestor could drift rapidly over time as in 
subpart A, yet not diverge from one another. This result would occur, for 
example, where the various lineages were responding in tandem to external 
shocks, such as changes in the economic or regulatory environment which, 
if true, would be consistent with Coates’ thesis of change being driven 
primarily by innovation. If, instead, the lineages from the same ancestor 
diverge rapidly, the explanation might more plausibly be attributed to 
editorial churning rather than rational adaptation. 
Because our aim is to examine multiple lineages from the same 
ancestor, we exclude clauses that had only one or no descendants. For each 
“family tree” descended from an ancestor, we compute the diversity among 
the ancestor’s descendants according to the number of generations to connect 
them. For example, a sibling pair of paragraphs descended from a common 
parent would involve two generations (one up from one sibling to the parent 
and one down to the other sibling). For a grandchild to its “uncle” paragraph 
the distance would be three (two generations up to the grandparent and one 
down to the uncle paragraph. For each such generational “distance” we then 
compute the average normalized edit distance among the paragraphs at that 
distance to assess the overall heterogeneity by number of generations 
removed. 
The following Figure sets forth the mean heterogeneity of descendants 
of the same ancestor by number of generations separating texts.  
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Figure IV: Distance Among Descendants By Generations 
The average distance among descendants from the same ancestor 
increases with generational separation just as the distance from an ancestor 
increases over the generations. Comparing this Figure to Figure III above 
shows that the process of “drift” is not only away from ancestors, but also 
away from other lineages descended from the same ancestor. Indeed, the rate 
of divergence is considerably faster among the descendants than from the 
ancestor.  The results show that all paragraphs are moving away from one 
another in an “expanding universe” of clauses akin to the “Big Bang” theory 
on the scale of boilerplate. This finding is consistent with widespread 
editorial churning that is haphazard, rather than driven by responses to 
exogenous legal events or attempts at innovation. 
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C. Geometry of the Clauses 
The previous sections show that virtually all boilerplate paragraphs are 
moving away from one another in terms of their textual similarity. In this 
subpart, we attempt to characterize the evolution of merger agreement 
clauses in terms of the geometrical shapes of the groupings of related clauses 
in a high-dimensional space. Although it is unusual to think of groups of 
contract clauses in terms of their shapes, the concept of difference or distance 
lends itself to such a graphical interpretation. 
Consider the graphs in the following figure derived from simulated 
data. 
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Figure V. A Spherically Distributed Cluster and an Ellipsoidal Cluster 
 
The upper graph has a well-defined center (or standard form) with a point 
cloud around it. The lower graph is elongated. These two graphs have 
approximately the same average distance to the nearest point, but they differ 
in the structure of the relationships.  
 
The top plot is similar to what one would expect from documents based 
on a standard form. Although parties often can negotiate terms in standard 
provisions, parties will reverse deal specific edits in subsequent uses of the 
form, meaning that documents based on forms will have a (hyper-)spherical 
distribution. This fact does not necessarily mean the documents are only 
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lightly edited. As in Figure V, documents can be close to the center or far 
from it; the key is that there is a center to which documents tend to revert 
because of the use of a form or standardized language. Similarly, documents 
not based on forms can change slowly and incrementally, but end up very far 
from where they began. The dramatic difference between the two document 
clusters turns on the extent to which the past editing history of the document 
shapes the form of its descendants. The same logic applies to analysis of 
particular provisions of boilerplate language that serve as loci of 
standardization within acquisition agreements.  
With this background, we now examine the data from the merger 
agreements. Although there are many methods that could examine whether 
the underlying data have a spherical or non-spherical structure, we use the 
eigenvalues derived from a multidimensional scaling of the distance matrices 
for sets of related paragraphs (those derived from a common ancestor).34 If 
the “clouds” of points representing clauses are roughly spherical, then the 
eigenvalues should be close to one another. If, on the other hand, the clouds 
have a linear structure to them, at least one of the eigenvalues will tend to be 
significantly larger than the other ones. 
Indeed, we find that very few of the “family trees” of boilerplate 
agreements have the spherical structure we would expect from documents 
based on a standard form. The first eigenvalue accounts for a median of .65 
of the variation of all the eigenvalues (obtained by dividing the first 
eigenvalue by the sum of the eigenvalues). This suggests that a small number 
of eigenvectors (or even one) can account for most of the variation, 
indicating that our data have a structure that deviates markedly from a 
spherical shape. 
One important implication of these findings is that there is no “center” 
or “standard” to most boilerplate paragraphs. One might expect that the 
ancestor paragraphs of a set of descendants would be the “center” of the 
descendants, and indeed that would be the case if the ancestor were used as 
a “form.” But each paragraph’s form is transient without fixed referents to 
which it reverts in subsequent generations. Each successive generation tends 
to “wander” farther from the original, leading to elongated lineages rather 
than offspring clustered around a central point.  The ends of these elongated 
“point clouds” bear little resemblance to each other, meaning that new forms 
of clauses are constantly arising in a process similar to speciation. 
 
 34. We used the cmdscale( ) function in R, which performs classic multidimensional scaling. 
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III.  DISCUSSION 
Our preliminary results confirm that the clause-by-clause evolution of 
merger agreements mirrors the overall evolution of agreements. The changes 
that are introduced at each generation of a document’s evolution tend to be 
preserved in subsequent generations, causing the text to drift significantly 
over time. This finding has a number of implications for the drafting process 
as well as the emerging literature on black holes and grey holes in contract 
law, which are explored in this Part.  
A. Where Does the Evolutionary Process Lead? 
The analysis in this paper provides support for the Choi/Scott/Gulati 
thesis that the rote use and encrustation processes may lead to black holes in 
contracts.  Boilerplate provisions in acquisition agreements are recycled 
from deal to deal, but idiosyncratic changes aggregate quickly from 
generation to generation and potentially alter the substance of these 
provisions.  We also identified equally significant evidence of “abrasion” as 
deletions shaped the evolution of boilerplate terms, even though over time 
these provisions, like acquisition agreements as a whole, tended to increase 
by length year by year. The data suggests a strong role for slippage in the 
drafting process that may lead toward unconsidered and ultimately 
unintended variations in documents.  
The high and increasing degree of editorial churning in boilerplate text 
appears to reflect potential structural shortcomings of the transactional 
drafting process.  In theory lawyers should know to respect boilerplate 
provisions unless there is a deal-specific reason to deviate from the text.35  
But in practice both our earlier study of the macro picture of M&A editing 
and this analysis of boilerplate text highlight how virtually every aspect of 
the agreement is potentially subject to the editing process.36  The extent of 
rapid speciation of boilerplate provisions suggests that the substantive 
benefits of standardized terms may be at risk.  Lawyers’ penchant for editing 
may transform not only the text, but also potentially the meaning of 
boilerplate provisions.  This problem is magnified by the sheer scale of the 
process as a multitude of lawyers rapidly edit a complex acquisition 
agreement and make a myriad of changes at each stage of the back-and-forth 
of negotiations. The problem appears to occur as lawyers process drafts 
 
 35. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 296–97 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining that “in routine 
transactions the typical agreement consists of a standard printed form that has been prepared by one party 
and assented to by the other with little or no opportunity for negotiation”). 
 36. See Susan L. Brody et al., Legal Drafting 3–5 (1994) (discussing “the myth that drafting is 
merely a fill-in-the-blank activity” and explaining the context-specific nature of legal drafting). 
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without having anyone ever check back to the initial precedent (or precedent 
boilerplate text) to see if the edits are necessary or may potentially transform 
the meaning of the boilerplate.  The absence of sufficient effort to check for 
deviations from standard text may help to explain how idiosyncratic and 
cosmetic edits arise and aggregate from one generation of an agreement to 
the next.    
However, the primary empirical conclusion of this analysis, that edits 
in one generation are often passed down to subsequent generations, could 
also have other interpretations. For example, it is possible that the edits 
improve the document and are retained as part of a process of evolution 
toward better agreements. At this preliminary stage, our analysis cannot 
definitively resolve the question of whether the cumulative edits over many 
generations have effects on M&A boilerplate that are positive, negative, or 
neutral. That would require a more fine-grained, qualitative analysis of 
individual boilerplate terms to attempt to assess the legal implications of 
textual changes over time, which we will pursue in a future work. However, 
the fact that the descendants of a common ancestor boilerplate term diverge 
from one another is strong evidence of random drift rather than conscious 
improvement. The potentially random drift driven by inadvertently copied 
deal-specific edits and consequent speciation may lead to black holes or grey 
holes as language becomes unmoored from accepted formulations with 
established interpretations. We will need to conduct further qualitative 
research to analyze in a selective fashion the degree to which the textual 
evolution of particular provisions has transformed the substantive meaning 
of boilerplate. 
B. The Consequences of Drift and Speciation 
The drift and speciation characteristics of the evolutionary process may 
lead to black holes where boilerplate loses its meaning. But this erosion of 
meaning does not necessarily occur in the majority of the cases, at least over 
a small number of generations. However, the larger the number of 
generations of drift from the original boilerplate, the more likely that the 
meaning of boilerplate will evolve over time in tandem with the increasing 
level of textual changes. Since lawyers typically choose precedents that are 
approximately one year old,37 it would be possible to extend the number of 
generations in future studies and engage in fine-grained qualitative analysis 
of the meaning of particular provisions. 
 
 37.    See Anderson & Manns, supra note 4, at 74–75 & Figure 1. 
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One clear consequence of rapid speciation is an erosion in the value of 
network effects as ostensibly boilerplate language becomes increasingly less 
standardized over time. Our study stipulated that boilerplate consisted of text 
that is at least 70 percent or more similar to a paragraph in its immediate 
precedent document, which is a high degree of similarity given the 
nonstandardized nature of acquisition agreements. But our empirical analysis 
shows that the degree of drift effectively undercuts the emergence of truly 
standardized boilerplate language in M&A agreements, at least in the sense 
of a standardized form that we see in other areas of contracts. This fact 
imposes significant costs on market participants. 
The first type of cost of nonstandardization is the easiest to see. The 
unnecessary effort expended in the drafting process as lawyers introduce 
random edits, another set of lawyers using the precedent attempt to 
compensate for those edits, and so forth, occurs generation after generation. 
This phenomenon is the “editorial churning” that we identified was 
occurring on an entire document basis in our previous article. In this paper, 
we show that the same churning is occurring on a clause-by-clause level, 
which serves as evidence of inefficiency. 
The more important costs of the lack of standardization, however, come 
through impairment of the network effects that arise through standardization 
of boilerplate in other contractual contexts. As ancestors change through 
encrustation, abrasion, and rote repetition of encrusted texts, the value of the 
network effects decline. As ancestors split into multiple descendant species 
based on divergent lineages of precedents and provisions, the network effect 
value declines further. In this paper we show that both trends occur in the 
M&A boilerplate context. The text both drifts from its original source and 
splits into multiple lineages, each of which drifts away from the ancestor and 
away from each other. 
C. Caveats 
Our work provides preliminary evidence for the rote use and 
encrustation phenomena in the context of merger agreements. The results 
have a number of limitations, however, as detailed in this section. 
1. Limited Number of Generations.  While our database of acquisition 
agreements covers 1994 to 2014, the nature of the SEC’s pre-2001 document 
format makes it difficult to engage in paragraph-for-paragraph comparisons 
for this earlier period. For this reason we plan to collect additional merger 
documents from earlier periods for a future work to ensure that we have more 
comprehensive coverage of earlier generations of agreements. Our hope is 
that this additional data will make it easier to substantiate both the extent of 
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document drift and the degree of erosion of the meaning of boilerplate 
provisions over time. 
2. Missing or Misidentified Precedents.  The starting point for our 
analysis is the identification of the likely precedent for each public company 
acquisition agreement in our database. We only look for precedent clauses 
within the documents determined to constitute the precedent documents. It 
is possible the precedent documents are not the actual precedent documents 
because the actual precedents are not available in the dataset. It is also 
possible that the precedent clauses are not found because the clause was 
copied from an agreement other than the precedent for the whole document 
(i.e., a clause was swapped from a different precedent).  
While we would tend to discount the significance of either of these 
possibilities in many cases, we do recognize that much of the “innovation” 
in acquisition agreements occurs from copying the innovations of first 
movers in other acquisition agreements. For this reason, if an exogenous 
legal shock arises, it is quite possible that lawyers will take advantage of 
SEC-mandated transparency and the absence of intellectual property 
protection to copy and paste relevant provisions from an agreement that is 
not the precedent for the current deal. This issue is more significant for our 
study of boilerplate than our broader study of the evolution of acquisition 
agreements because of our ability to identify the likely precedent for each 
agreement with a high degree of probability based on the degree of 
similarity.  
But we should not overstate the risk that the opportunistic copying of 
innovations from unrelated agreements is skewing our boilerplate analysis. 
In the case of swapped-in language from another precedent, we would expect 
to find large edit distances from the precedent underpinning the current deal. 
As shown in Figure II, a typical merger agreement clause does not find close 
matches in another random merger agreement, even for boilerplate 
provisions. Therefore, we would expect that we would typically not even 
identify the swapped-in clause as boilerplate for the purposes of our study. 
For this reason the boilerplate provisions that are the focus of our study are 
much more likely to have continuity from one precedent to the next. While 
numerous edits take place throughout acquisition agreements and boilerplate 
provisions, the empirical evidence suggests that piecemeal editing rather 
than transplantation of terms from other precedents is the norm.  
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CONCLUSION 
Our study shows that the high levels of “editorial churning” that take 
place in the process of transforming each precedent into the current 
acquisition agreement affect agreements on a clause-by-clause basis, not just 
an entire document basis. Boilerplate provisions live on from deal to deal, 
yet gradually shed their textual integrity and potentially lose their clear 
meaning as they evolve over generations of lineages.  
We show that incremental changes in boilerplate from one generation 
to the next lead to rapid “speciation” of the terms. We demonstrate that this 
textual “drift” takes place both within boilerplate that falls within a given 
chain of precedent, but also even more broadly for boilerplate provisions that 
have a common ancestor precedent, but evolve separately along different 
lineages of precedents. Our findings reinforce the black hole concern that 
Choi, Gulati, and Scott raised that rote usage, combined with encrustation 
and abrasion of terms may distort the degree of standardization and meaning 
of boilerplate over even a short number of generations. We plan on building 
on this study for future research that is larger in scope and duration and also 
integrates qualitative assessments of the evolution of particular boilerplate 
provisions over time. 
 
Appendix: Sample Evolution of a Boilerplate Provision 
 
      We are including an example of the evolution of a boilerplate provision 
to provide a concrete illustration of the extent of changes that routinely occur 
over a small number of generations. The following boilerplate representation 
attests to the management’s compliance with internal control requirements 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Anyone who is familiar with this requirement 
would recognize that this standardized language could easily be carried over 
verbatim into subsequent agreements (with the minor exception of the date 
in section iv and any adjustment for the numbering of this representation in 
subsequent agreements).  We highlight the evolution of this boilerplate 
provision over four generations in a four-year period to highlight the degree 
of (largely) cosmetic changes in the drafting process.38   
 
38 Each of the four generations of the internal controls requirement boilerplate comes from an SEC Edgar 
filing: (1) Agreement and Plan of Merger and Reorganization among ON Semiconductor, Inc., Centaur 
Acquisition Corporation, and Catalyst Semiconductor, Inc., July 16, 2008, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899636/000119312508152773/dex21.htm; (2) Agreement and 
Plan of Merger and Reorganization among ON Semiconductor, Pac-10 Acquisition Corporation, and 
California Micro Devices Corporation, Dec. 14, 2009, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800460/000119312509252521/dex21.htm; (3) Agreement and 
Plan of Merger among Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc., Hammer Acquisition, Inc., and Henry 
Bros. Electronics, Inc., Oct. 5, 2010, available at 
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First Generation 
 
       f the acquired corporations have implemented and maintain a system of 
internal control over financial reporting as defined in Rules 13a-15(f) and 
15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act sufficient to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial 
statements for external purposes in accordance with GAAP including 
without limitation that  
i transactions are executed in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorizations  
ii transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset 
accountability  
iii access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization and  
iv the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with 
respect to any differences since April 27, 2008  
 
a there have not been any changes in the acquired corporations 
internal control over financial reporting that have materially affected or are 
reasonably likely to materially affect the acquired corporations internal 
control over financial reporting and 
 
b all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses as such terms 
are defined by the public accounting oversight board have been disclosed to 
the company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the company 
board. 
 
Second Generation 
 
In the second generation of this boilerplate provision, the language 
was virtually identical (with the understandable exception of a numbering 
and a date change until section iv(b).  The revised iv(b) and new iv(c) was 
as follows (with deletions crossed out and additions underlined): 
 
 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099918/000114420410053009/v198560_ex2-1.htm; (4) 
Agreement and Plan of Merger among Aegis Lifestyle, Inc., Morgan Acquisition, Inc., and mktg, inc., 
May 27, 2014, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886475/000101905614000764/ex2_1.htm. 
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        3.4(g)2.4(f) The Acquired Corporations have implemented and 
maintain a system of internal control over financial reporting (as defined in 
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act) sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting 
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in 
accordance with GAAP, including, without limitation, that  
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorizations,  
             (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset 
accountability,  
             (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization, and  
             (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with 
respect to any differences. Since March 31, 2009 April 27, 2008,  
 
(a) there have not been any changes in the Acquired Corporations’ 
internal control over financial reporting that have materially 
affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the 
Acquired Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting; 
and 
(b) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses as such 
terms in the design or operation of the Acquired Corporations’ 
internal control over financial reporting which are defined by the 
Public Accounting Oversight Board reasonably likely to adversely 
affect the Acquired Corporations’ ability to record, process, 
summarize and report financial information have been disclosed to 
the Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the 
Company Board, and  
(c) there has not been any fraud, whether or not material, that 
involves management or other employees who have a significant 
role in the Acquired Corporations’ internal control over financial 
reporting. 
 
Third Generation 
 
The third generation of this boilerplate provision changed the date 
and added a non-substantive reference to the company’s disclosure system, 
but then retained the second generation’s additions to section iv(b) and added 
a significant amount of additional text: 
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         2.4(f)(g)           The Acquired Corporations have implemented and 
maintain a system of internal control over financial reporting (as defined in 
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act) sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting 
and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in 
accordance with GAAP, including, without limitation, that  
          (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorizations,  
          (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset 
accountability,  
          (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization, and  
          (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with 
respect to any differences. Except as set forth in Part 3.4(g) of the 
Company’s Disclosure Schedule, since January 1, 2008 Since April 27, 
2008,   
                (A) there have not been any changes in the Acquired 
Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting that have materially 
affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the Acquired 
Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting,  
                  (B) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (as such 
terms are defined by the Public Accounting Oversight Board) have been 
disclosed to the Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the 
Company Board, in the design or operation of the Acquired Corporations’ 
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to 
adversely affect the Acquired Corporations’ ability to record, process, 
summarize and report financial information have been disclosed to the 
Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee of the Company’s 
board of directors, and  
                  (C) there has not been any fraud, whether or not material, that 
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the 
Acquired Corporations’ internal control over financial reporting. Part 
3.4(g) of the Company Disclosure Schedule lists, and the Company has 
delivered to Parent copies of, all reports and other documents concerning 
internal control filed with the SEC or delivered to the Company by its 
auditors since the beginning of the first fiscal year of the Company referred 
to in clause (i) of the second sentence of Section 3.4(a). Part 3.4(g) of the 
Company Disclosure Schedule lists, and the Company has delivered to 
Parent copies of, all written descriptions of, and all policies, manuals and 
other documents promulgating, such internal accounting controls. 
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Fourth Generation 
 
        In contrast, by the fourth generation of this boilerplate lineage, the edits 
were so far-reaching that the drafters effectively rewrote approximately one-
half of the first generation’s text, which is as follows: 
 
        2.4(f)(g) The Acquired Corporations have Company has implemented 
and maintains a system of internal control over financial reporting (as 
defined in Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) under the Exchange Act) 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of 
financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external 
purposes in accordance with GAAP, including without limitation and that  
         (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorizations,  
         (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with GAAP and to maintain asset 
accountability,   
         (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization, and  
         (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at provide reasonable intervals and appropriate action is 
taken with respect to any differences. Since assurance regarding the 
prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or 
disposition of the Company’s assets that could have a material effect on the 
Company’s financial statements. Except as set forth in the Company SEC 
Reports since April 27, 2008, (a 1, 2012,  
                  (A) there have not been any changes in the Acquired 
Corporation’s Company’s internal control over financial reporting that 
have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the 
Acquired Corporation’s Company’s internal control over financial 
reporting, and  
                   (B) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses (as 
such terms in the design or operation of the Company’s internal control 
over financial reporting which are defined by the Public Accounting 
Oversight Board) reasonably likely to adversely affect the Company’s 
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information have 
been disclosed to the Company’s outside auditors and the audit committee 
of the Company’s board of directors, and  
                   (C) there has not been any fraud, whether or not material, that 
involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the 
Company’s internal control over financial reporting. The Company Board 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327687 
  
252  DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:219 
has made available to Parent copies of all material policies, manuals and 
other material documents promulgating such internal accounting controls. 
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